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ABSTRACT
We show how to use panel data on household consumption to directly estimate households’ risk
preferences. Specifically, we measure heterogeneity in risk aversion among households in Thai vil-
lages using a full risk-sharing model, which we then test allowing for this heterogeneity. There is
substantial, statistically significant heterogeneity in estimated risk preferences. Full insurance can-
not be rejected. As the risk sharing, as-if-complete-markets theory might predict, estimated risk
preferences are unrelated to wealth or other characteristics. The heterogeneity matters for policy:
Although the average household would benefit from eliminating village-level risk, less-risk-averse
households who are paid to absorb that risk would be worse off by several percent of household
consumption.
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1. Introduction
We measure heterogeneity in risk aversion among households running farm and non-
farm enterprises in a developing country using a full risk-sharing model. From the literature
on risk sharing, a household’s risk aversion is identified up to scale by examining how much its
consumption co-moves with aggregate consumption. The intuition — which dates to Wilson
(1968) — is that efficient risk sharing allocates more risk to less risk-averse households, so a
household whose consumption strongly co-moves with the aggregate must be relatively less
risk averse.
The data we analyze are an unusually long monthly panel of households in villages
in Thailand. We test the null hypothesis of full risk sharing in these data, incorporating
our measure of heterogeneity in preferences, and find that the null is difficult to reject.
This finding suggests that local institutions provide something close to a complete markets
allocation. Our goal here is not to identify the specific institutions that aid in risk sharing,
but we conjecture that they may include gifts between households as well as implicitly state-
contingent informal or formal loans, such as those described in Udry (1994).1
Further, we find that estimated risk tolerance is not significantly correlated with de-
mographic variables or household wealth. The finding of no correlation between preferences
and wealth is consistent, however, with the complete markets hypothesis and, since we are
measuring relative risk tolerance, consistent with the finding of Chiappori and Paiella (2011)
that the correlation between wealth and relative risk aversion — as estimated from portfolio
structures in Italian panel data — is very weak. In addition, the lack of correlation between
preferences and demographics is reminiscent of the “massive unexplained heterogeneity” in
Italian households’ preferences reported by Guiso and Paiella (2008).
Heterogeneity in risk tolerance matters for policy. To make this point, we conduct
a hypothetical experiment in which we estimate the welfare gains and losses that would
result from eliminating all aggregate, village-level risk. If all households were equally risk
1Using the same data set that we analyze, Sripakdeevong and Townsend (2012) find that use of borrowing
products is associated with lower coefficients of relative risk aversion. However, this relationship is limited to
the subset of borrowers who do not roll over their loans. Other borrowers defer repayment when circumstances
are bad by refinancing across lenders (typically informal lenders and the semi-formal village fund). The
combined credit contracts resemble insurance, and these borrowers do not have significantly different risk
aversion from non-borrowers.
averse, all households would benefit from eliminating aggregate risk. Heterogeneity makes
the situation more interesting. As demonstrated by Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) using U.S. data,
heterogeneity in preferences implies that some sufficiently risk-tolerant households would
experience welfare losses from eliminating aggregate risk, because these households effectively
sell insurance against aggregate risk to their more risk-averse neighbors and collect risk premia
for doing so. In the Thai data, we find that households live with a great deal of aggregate
risk — figure 1 shows the volatility of aggregate consumption in each village, with a monthly
standard deviation of about 13 percent — and that the average household would be willing
to pay to avoid this risk. However, not all households would be willing to pay. In fact, if
aggregate risk were eliminated, some relatively risk-tolerant households would suffer welfare
losses equivalent to several percent of mean consumption. Heterogeneity in the population
is, therefore, substantial.
Our study is far from the first to measure heterogeneity in risk preferences. In devel-
opment economics, efforts to measure risk aversion date at least to Binswanger (1980), who
used experiments and hypothetical questions to measure the risk aversion of households in
India. Many subsequent authors have used similar methods; recent examples from develop-
ing countries include Harrison et al. (2010), Cole et al. (2012), and Liu (forthcoming). The
innovation in our work is that we estimate preferences from data on households’ everyday
behavior, rather than from their behavior in experiments that may or may not correspond to
decisions the households would face if the experimenter were not present. (Our work is thus
similar in spirit to that of Chiappori and Paiella, 2011, who estimate Italian households’ pref-
erences from their portfolio choices.) However, we cannot directly compare the magnitude of
our risk aversion estimates to those in the experimental literature because our estimates are
identified only up to scale. We also contribute to a newer literature on tests of risk sharing
with heterogeneous preferences. Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) and Mazzocco and Saini (2012) de-
velop tests that do not require estimates of preferences but, as a result, require either large
numbers of households or complex nonparametric methods. We provide an alternative test
that uses our estimates of preferences to test for full insurance in a simple linear regression.
The assumption of full insurance underlying our preference estimates is admittedly a
strong one. There is an extensive literature investigating the extent of consumption insurance
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both in the Thai villages we study and in developing countries more generally. A line of work
using the same data as we analyze generally finds small or no violations of the hypothesis of
complete consumption insurance in these villages; see Bonhomme et al. (2012), Kinnan and
Townsend (2012), Karaivanov and Townsend (2013), and Alem and Townsend (forthcoming).
Of course, though, many other papers have found violations of full insurance in other contexts.
We do not claim that full insurance is a good assumption everywhere, only that it is supported
in the particular context we are studying. We also recognize that our method for estimating
preferences depends strongly on this assumption. When we derive the method, we also use
some back-of-the-envelope calculations to put a bound on the bias if the assumption of full
insurance fails. For example, if risk sharing in Thailand is imperfect but no worse than among
households in the United States, then our estimate of a household’s risk tolerance turns out
to be a mixture of at least 91 percent that household’s risk tolerance and at most 9 percent
other, confounding factors.2
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we lay out the theory underlying our
methods for estimating preferences and for testing for full insurance. In section 3, we describe
the Thai data. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
2. Theory
In this section, we derive a method to estimate households’ risk preferences based
on measurements of risk sharing among households, a back-of-the-envelope bound on the
bias in our preference estimates if the null of full insurance is not correct, and a test of full
insurance based on our preference estimates. We then show how to estimate the welfare cost
of aggregate risk in the villages in our data, as a function of households’ risk preferences.
2Some support for our estimates can be found by using other methods to estimate preferences. In Chiappori
et al. (2013), we derive alternative estimates that do not rely on full insurance, only on the assumption that
households choose their portfolios optimally given whatever market incompleteness exists. The idea of this
portfolio-choice method is that more risk-averse households will choose safer portfolios and have smoother
consumption. The method is similar to that used by Mehra and Prescott (1985) for a representative-agent
model, but in Chiappori et al. (2013), we apply it to individual households. We show that the portfolio-choice
method is valid whether or not there is full insurance. We find that in most villages, the estimates based on
portfolio choice are positively correlated with estimates based on full insurance. Thus, the portfolio-choice
estimates provide some basis for confidence in the full-insurance estimates. However, the portfolio-choice
method is not as broadly applicable as the full-insurance method because it applies only to households that
make investments and have positive realized mean returns.
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We assume that there is one consumption good, c, and that households maximize
time-separable discounted expected utility with constant relative risk aversion. We allow
each household to have its own rate of time preference and its own coefficient of relative
risk aversion. Because we will work with monthly data, we need to distinguish consumption
fluctuations that are due to risk from consumption fluctuations that are due to seasonal
preferences. Therefore, we also allow each household to have month-specific preferences. That
is, household i’s preferences over consumption sequences {c∗it(st)}, where st is the history of
household-specific and aggregate states of nature up to date t, are represented by
E0
[
T∑
t=0
βtiξi,m(t)
[c∗it(s
t)]1−γi
1− γi
]
, (1)
where βi is the household’s rate of time preference, γi is the household’s coefficient of
relative risk aversion, ξi,m is the household’s relative preference for consuming in month
m ∈ {Jan, Feb, . . . ,Dec}, and m(t) is the month corresponding to date t. We assume ξi,m is
non-stochastic.
We assume that consumption is measured with error: We assume that we observe not
true consumption c∗it but instead cit = c
∗
it exp (it). Our assumptions on the measurement
error it are relatively weak. We assume that it is mean independent of the date t and of the
village’s true aggregate consumption C∗jt(s
t) (defined more precisely below), has mean zero
for each household, and is uncorrelated across households:
E[it|i, t, C∗jt(st)] = 0
E[iti′,t′ ] = 0 ∀i 6= i′,∀t, t′.
(2)
Notice in particular that we are not assuming anything about homoskedasticity or serial
correlation of the measurement errors.
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A. Estimating Preferences
Let C∗jt(s
t) be the aggregate consumption available in village j at date t after history
st.3 Then, following Diamond (1967) and Wilson (1968), any Pareto-efficient consumption
allocation satisfies
ln c∗it(s
t) =
lnαi
γi
+
ln βi
γi
t+
ln ξi,m(t)
γi
+
1
γi
[− lnλj(i),t(st)], (3)
where j(i) is household i’s village, αi is a non-negative Pareto weight, and λj(i),t(s
t) is the
Lagrange multiplier on village j’s aggregate resource constraint
∑
i c
∗
it(s
t) = C∗jt(s
t) at date
t after history st. The multiplier λj(i),t(s
t) is a function only of aggregate resources C∗jt(s
t);
for a given village j, any two histories with the same aggregate resources at a particular date
will have the same λ at that date. To be concise, we henceforth let λjt denote this multiplier.
The first term in (3) is a household-specific fixed effect; some households simply are
better off than others and, on average, consume more. The second term is a household-
specific time trend that increases on a monthly basis. Formally, these trends depend on the
household’s rate of time preference βi; informally, the household-specific trends could stand
for anything that makes some households want to have different trends in consumption than
other households, such as life-cycle considerations. The third term — in which ξi,m(t) is a
household-specific calendar-month effect that repeats every 12 months — reflects differences in
the seasonality of households’ preferences. The fourth term shows how consumption depends
on aggregate shocks λjt: Consumption moves more with aggregate shocks for less risk-averse
households.
Equation (3) reflects Wilson’s (1968) result that doubling every household’s coef-
ficient of relative risk aversion will not change the set of Pareto-efficient allocations: The
consumption allocation in (3) does not change if, for any non-zero constant mj specific to
village j, we replaced γi with mjγi, replaced λjt with mjλjt, and adjusted αi, βi, and ξi,m(t)
appropriately. In consequence, when we use a method based on (3) to estimate preferences,
we will be able to identify risk preferences only up to scale within each village.
3We take no stand on storage or inter-village risk sharing. If storage is possible, C∗jt(s
t) is aggregate
consumption net of any aggregate storage. If risk is shared between villages, C∗jt(s
t) is aggregate consumption
in village j after any transfers to or from other villages.
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Since consumption is measured with error, an equation for observed consumption
under efficient risk sharing is
ln cit =
lnαi
γi
+
ln βi
γi
t+
ln ξi,m(t)
γi
+
1
γi
(− lnλjt) + it, (4)
where we have suppressed the dependence on the history st for convenience. Under the main-
tained hypothesis of full insurance, the data must satisfy (4), and we can use this equation
to estimate each household’s risk preferences γi.
4 The intuition for how we estimate risk
preferences is that under full insurance, a household whose consumption moves more with
aggregate shocks must be less risk averse. Further, under full insurance, the only reason two
households’ consumptions can move together is that both of their consumptions are co-moving
with aggregate shocks. Thus, if two households’ consumptions are strongly correlated, they
must both have consumption that moves strongly with the aggregate shock; they must both
be relatively risk tolerant. Similarly, if two households’ consumptions are not strongly corre-
lated, at least one must have consumption that does not move strongly with the aggregate
shock; at least one must be very risk averse. In consequence, we can identify relatively more
and less risk-averse households by looking at the pairwise correlations of their consumption.
Our method uses only the data on households whose consumption is observed in every
time period. Suppose that there are J villages and that for each village j, we have data on
Nj households observed in T time periods. These need not be all households in the village
for all time periods in which the village has existed.
Let {νit}Tt=1 be the residuals from linearly projecting the time series of log consumption
for household i on a household-specific intercept, time trend, and month dummies. Log
consumption is the left-hand side of (4). Thus, since (4) holds and projection is a linear
operator, the log consumption residuals νit must equal the total of the residuals we would
obtain from separately projecting each term on the right-hand side of (4) on a household-
specific intercept, time trend, and month dummies. There are no residuals from projecting
the first three terms on the right-hand side since these terms are equal to a household-
4In principle, we can also estimate each household’s time preferences βi, but that is not our goal here —
primarily because βi is difficult to interpret since it represents a combination of pure time preference and
life-cycle motives.
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specific intercept, time trend, and month dummies. Thus, νit must equal the total of the
residuals from projecting (− lnλjt) and it. Specifically, suppose that we could observe the
Lagrange multipliers λjt, and let `jt be the residual we would obtain if we hypothetically
projected (− lnλjt) on an intercept, a time trend, and month dummies.5 Also suppose that
we could observe the measurement errors it, and let ˜it be the residual we would obtain if we
hypothetically projected the time series of it on a household-specific intercept, time trend,
and month dummies. Then equation (4) implies
νit =
1
γi
`j(i),t + ˜it. (5)
Since it is uncorrelated across households, (5) implies that for any two households i and i
′
in the same village j,
E[νitνi′,t] =
1
γiγi′
E[`2jt], i 6= i′. (6)
As discussed above, risk aversion is identified only up to scale within each village; equation
(5) would not change if, for any non-zero constant ηj specific to village j, we replaced γi with
ηjγi and `j with ηj`j. Since the scale ηj is unidentified, we can normalize E[`
2
jt] = 1. With
this normalization, (6) reduces to
E[νitνi′,t] =
1
γiγi′
, i 6= i′. (7)
Equation (7) applies to each pair of distinct households, so the equation gives us Nj(Nj−1)/2
moment conditions in Nj unknowns (the risk aversion coefficients {γi}Nji=1). In principle, we
could use these moment conditions to estimate the risk aversion coefficients by the Generalized
Method of Moments. However, we would then have many more moment conditions than
months of data — for example, in a village with Nj = 30 households, which is typical, we
would have 435 moment conditions but only 84 months of data — and GMM can perform
poorly when there are many moment conditions (Han and Phillips, 2006). We therefore
5The results of this projection will be the same for all households in a village since the panel is balanced
and λjt is the same for all households in the village. Notice that the log Lagrange multipliers (− lnλjt) are not
necessarily orthogonal to either time trends or calendar months because the Lagrange multipliers represent
aggregate consumption risk and need not be strictly tied to either time trends or seasonality.
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collapse (7) to one moment condition per household by summing over the other households
i′ 6= i, reducing our moment conditions to
∑
i′ 6=i
E[νitνi′,t] =
1
γi
∑
i′ 6=i
1
γi′
. (8)
Equation (8) gives us Nj moment conditions in Nj unknowns, so we have a just-
identified system. We use these just-identified moment conditions to estimate the parameters
by GMM.6 We can also use GMM to test the null hypothesis that all households in village
j have identical preferences, by imposing the restriction that γ1 = γ2 = · · · = γNj and then
testing the Nj − 1 overidentifying restrictions with the usual Hansen (1982) χ2 statistic.
In our GMM estimation, we must impose a sign normalization on the estimated co-
efficients of relative risk aversion since the moment conditions do not change if we multiply
each γi by −1. Since the true coefficients of relative risk aversion must be positive, we impose
the normalization that
∑Nj
i=1 γi > 0.
The assumption that measurement error is uncorrelated across households is crucial for
our results, because we identify household i’s risk aversion from how its consumption moves
relative to aggregate consumption. If measurement error were correlated across households
and the correlated measurement errors had the same proportional effect on all households
— which would happen, for example, if the price index were measured with error — the
estimated correlation of each household’s consumption with aggregate consumption would be
biased toward 1. In that case, all of our risk aversion estimates would be biased toward 1
and our test could fail to reject the null of identical preferences even when preferences are
heterogeneous. Of course, under other assumptions on the measurement error, the bias could
go in other directions.
The assumption of full insurance is crucial for our estimates, but we can roughly bound
6An alternative approach would be to observe that (4) is essentially a factor model — the Lagrange
multiplier lnλjt is an unobserved factor, and risk tolerance 1/γi is the factor loading that specifies how
the factor impacts household i — and to estimate the equation by standard factor analysis methods. With
a small number of households, as here, the identifying assumption for factor analysis would be that the
measurement errors it are uncorrelated over time and across households and that their variance is constant
across households at each date t. Examination of the residuals from the equation suggests, however, that the
variance differs across households. Thus, we were not confident in the factor analysis assumptions and did
not pursue that approach.
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the bias caused by violations of this assumption. Suppose that insurance is not perfect and,
in particular, that the partial-insurance model of Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) applies: There is
a household-specific cost φi
cit
2
[ln (cit/income it)]
2 of having a household’s consumption differ
from its income. Under this partial-insurance model, the observed consumption allocation is
no longer (4) but instead can be approximated by
ln cit =
lnαi
φi + γi
+
ln βi
φi + γi
t+
ln ξi,m(t)
φi + γi
+
1
φi + γi
(− lnλjt) + φi
φi + γi
ln income it + it. (9)
Suppose further that income depends on a household-specific intercept, household-specific
trend, household-specific monthly seasonality, and aggregate shocks according to a factor
structure:
ln income it = ζ0i + ζ1it+ ζ2i,m(t) + ζ3i lnλjt + ζ4it. (10)
Then (9) can be rewritten as
ln cit =
(
lnαi
φi + γi
+ ζ0i
φi
φi + γi
)
+
(
ln βi
φi + γi
+ ζ1i
φi
φi + γi
)
t
+
(
ln ξi,m(t)
φi + γi
+ ζ2i,m(t)
φi
φi + γi
)
+
1/γi + ζ3iφi/γi
1 + φi/γi
(− lnλjt) + it + φi
φi + γi
ζ4i. (11)
If we apply our preferences estimator to data generated by (11), our estimator of 1/γi defined
by the moment conditions (8) will converge not to true risk tolerance 1/γi but instead to
1/γi + ζ3iφi/γi
1 + φi/γi
. (12)
In consequence, when full insurance does not hold, our method does not identify true risk
tolerance 1/γi but rather a linear combination of true risk tolerance and the cyclicality of
income ζ3i, with the weights in the linear combination depending on the insurance cost φi.
Schulhofer-Wohl’s (2011) estimates suggest that E[φi/γi] is approximately 0.1 for the United
States. Because consumption insurance appears to be better in the rural Thai villages than
in the United States, we could view this number as an upper bound for φi/γi in the Thai
context. Thus, if risk sharing in Thailand is imperfect but no worse than in the United States,
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our estimator of 1/γi would converge to
1
1.1
1
γi
+
0.1
1.1
ζ3i. (13)
That is, if full insurance fails but is at least as good as in the United States, this calculation
suggests that our estimates are a mixture of at least 91 percent risk tolerance and at most 9
percent cyclicality of income.
B. Test of Efficient Risk Sharing
The standard test for efficient risk sharing in the literature (e.g., Cochrane, 1991;
Mace, 1991; Townsend, 1994) can be described as follows. If agents share risk efficiently, then
the individual consumption of agent i should depend only on aggregate shocks, as described
by equation (4), but not on i’s idiosyncratic income shocks. This result suggests running a
regression like
ln cit =
lnαi
γi
+
ln βi
γi
t+
ln ξi,m(t)
γi
+
1
γi
(− lnλjt) + bj ln income it + it, (14)
where household i lives in village j(i). The test, now, would be whether the coefficient bj
is significantly different from zero. Efficient risk sharing would imply bj = 0, whereas any
deviation from perfect risk sharing would result in bj 6= 0.
In practice, most of the literature uses a slightly different test and runs the regression
ln cit = ai + dj(i),t + bj ln income it + uit, (15)
where djt represents the aggregate shock in village j at date t.
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The key difference between (14) and (15) is that (15) ignores heterogeneity in both
risk and time preferences and absorbs the household-specific trends and seasonality into
the aggregate shocks djt. Recently, Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) and Mazzocco and Saini (2012)
have shown that tests based on (15) may be biased against the null of full insurance when
risk preferences are heterogeneous, because (15) assumes that aggregate shocks affect all
7For the sake of precision, we write djt rather than λjt in this equation; indeed, if bj 6= 0, our model in
the previous section is incorrect and djt need not be the Lagrange multiplier λjt.
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households’ consumption equally even though, under heterogeneous preferences, aggregate
shocks have a larger effect on the consumption of less risk-averse households. Both Schulhofer-
Wohl (2011) and Mazzocco and Saini (2012) propose alternative tests that do not assume
identical preferences. Here, we present another alternative test that also allows heterogeneity,
based on our method for estimating risk preferences.
If we multiply both sides of (4) by γi, we find that efficient risk sharing implies
γi ln cit = lnαi + t ln βi + ln ξi,m(t) + (− lnλjt) + γiit. (16)
Thus, although aggregate shocks do not affect all households’ consumption equally, aggregate
shocks do have an equal effect on consumption scaled by risk aversion. To test whether risk
sharing is efficient, we test whether income is excluded from (16). That is, we run the
regression
γˆi ln cit = lnαi + t ln βi + ln ξi,m(t) + (− lnλjt) + bj ln income it + γiit + uit, (17)
where
uit = (γˆi − γi) ln cit (18)
and where, because we do not observe the household’s actual risk aversion, we use the esti-
mated risk aversion γˆi to construct the dependent variable. Given estimates of risk aversion,
the regression in (17) is straightforward to estimate because the right-hand side includes only
village aggregate time dummies (− lnλjt) rather than the interaction of risk aversion with
time dummies. Under the null hypothesis of full insurance, γˆi is a consistent estimator of γi
and therefore uˆit converges in probability to 0 for all i, t in the limit as T → ∞. Since it is
independent of all variables in the model, it follows that the ordinary least squares estimator
of bj is consistent; thus, under the null of full insurance, the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimator of bj should not be statistically significantly different from zero.
Thus, our test for full insurance is as follows. First, obtain risk preference estimates
γˆi. Second, regress γˆi ln cit on ln income it, an aggregate time dummy, and household-specific
intercepts, trends, and season dummies as shown in (17). Finally, test whether the estimated
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coefficient on ln income it is zero. Because γˆi appears only in the dependent variable, we do
not need to correct the point estimates or standard errors in (17) to account for the estimation
of γˆi in a previous step.
One might fear that our test would not detect failures of full insurance if imperfect
insurance biases γˆi in a way that reduces the power of our test. However, biased estimates
of γi do not affect our test as long as the bias is common across households in the village.
Suppose γˆi converges in probability to xjγi for some constant xj. Then (14) implies
γˆi ln cit = xj lnαi + xjt ln βi + xj ln ξi,m(t) + xj(− lnλjt) + xjbj ln income it
+ xjγiit + (γˆi − xjγi) ln cit, (19)
which is identical to our risk-sharing test (17) but with all terms on the right-hand side
multiplied by xj. Thus, if xj < 1, the coefficient on income in our risk-sharing test will be
biased toward zero.8 The bias does not, however, affect the outcome of our risk-sharing test.
Let sj(x) be the probability limit of the standard error of the income coefficient when the bias
is xj = x. All else equal, the standard error scales with the standard deviation of the error
term xjγiit; hence, sj(xj) = xjsj(1). Let bˆj(x) be the estimator of the income coefficient
when the bias is x, and notice that bˆj(xj) = xj bˆj(1). If tj(x) is the t-statistic of the income
coefficient when the bias is x, then the t-statistic when we have biased estimates of γi is
tj(xj) =
bˆj(xj)
sj(xj)
=
xj bˆj(1)
xjsj(1)
=
bˆj(1)
sj(1)
= tj(1), (20)
which shows that the t-statistic does not change when the bias changes. In consequence, the
p-values and the outcome of our test are invariant to the bias in the estimates of γi.
C. The Welfare Cost of Aggregate Risk
We follow the method of Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) to estimate the welfare cost of aggre-
gate risk. The basic idea, following Lucas (1987), is to calculate a household’s expected utility
from a risky consumption stream and compare it with the amount of certain consumption
8We would expect xj < 1 if insurance is imperfect and household income is positively correlated with
aggregate consumption, because then income would be an omitted variable in (5).
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that would yield the same utility.
In essence, we will compare three economies. Economy 1 is the real economy; the
aggregate endowment in it is risky. Economy 2 is a hypothetical economy in which the aggre-
gate endowment is constant and equal to the expected aggregate endowment from economy
1. Some households would be better off in economy 2 than economy 1, while others are worse
off, depending on their risk aversion: In economy 1, a nearly risk-neutral household can sell
insurance against aggregate risk to more risk-averse households, and this nearly risk-neutral
household would be worse off if it lived in economy 2 and had no opportunity to sell insurance.
We would like to estimate how much better off or worse off households would be in economy
2. To do so, we introduce economy 3, which has a constant aggregate endowment equal to
(1− k) times the aggregate endowment in economy 2. For each household, we find the value
of k such that the household would be indifferent between living in economy 1 and living in
economy 3. If k > 0, then the household is indifferent between the real economy 1 and a
hypothetical economy where consumption is certain but smaller by the fraction k; thus, the
household is willing to give up a fraction k of its consumption to eliminate aggregate risk. If
k < 0, aggregate risk gives the household a welfare gain equal to a fraction k of consumption.
We briefly outline the method here and refer interested readers to Schulhofer-Wohl
(2008) for details.
We assume the world consists of a sequence of one-period economies indexed by date
t.9 Each economy can be in one of several states s, each with probability pis. The states and
their probabilities are the same for all dates t, and households know the probabilities. Before
the state is known, the households trade a complete set of contingent claims.
We assume aggregate income in economy t in state s is gtms, where gt is a non-
random sequence and ms represents the shock in state s. We normalize the shocks such that
9By considering one-period economies, we avoid the problem that households with different risk preferences
also have different preferences for intertemporal substitution and thus will make intertemporal trades even
in the absence of aggregate risk. The assumption of a one-period economy means we are treating shocks as
serially uncorrelated. We think this assumption is reasonable in the context of rural villages where many
shocks are related to weather. If shocks are actually persistent, our results will underestimate the welfare
costs of risk. However, as Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) notes, persistent shocks in a dynamic model would be
similar to i.i.d. shocks with a large variance; thus, allowing for persistence might raise the magnitude of our
welfare estimates but would not change the key result that heterogeneity in risk preferences reduces welfare
costs compared with an economy where there is no heterogeneity.
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∑
s pisms = 1, i.e., the expected value of aggregate income in economy t is gt. There is no
storage (or, if there is storage, “aggregate income” refers to aggregate income net of aggregate
storage).
Each household is described by a coefficient of relative risk aversion γi and an en-
dowment share wi: Household i’s endowment in economy t in state s is wigtms, so there is
only aggregate risk and no idiosyncratic risk. We assume the joint distribution of endowment
shares and risk preferences is the same at each date.10
Because markets are complete, the welfare theorems apply, and the consumption allo-
cation will be the same as we derived for the risk-sharing method. One can use the allocation
to derive household i’s expected utility in economy t before the state is realized. Let U∗it
denote this expected utility. (This is expected utility in economy 1.) Now suppose the
household gave up a fraction k of its endowment but eliminated all aggregate risk, receiving
consumption equal to wi(1− k)gt in every state in economy t. Let Uˆit(k) be the utility of a
household that gave up a fraction k of its endowment but eliminated all aggregate risk. (This
is expected utility in economy 3.) The welfare cost of aggregate risk, expressed as a fraction
of consumption, is the value of k that solves
Uˆit(k) = U
∗
it. (21)
Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) shows that the welfare cost depends only on the household’s risk
aversion γi, not on its endowment share or the size of the economy gt, and can be written as
k(γi) = 1−
(∑
s
pis(p
∗
s)
−(1−γi)/γi
)γi/(1−γi)
, (22)
where pisp
∗
s is the equilibrium price of a claim to one unit of consumption in state s and where
the prices are normalized such that
∑
s pisp
∗
sms = 1. It is worth noting that for γi sufficiently
close to zero, k(γi) is negative, which means the household has a welfare gain from aggregate
risk. The gain arises because the household is selling so much insurance to more risk-averse
10Since the economy lasts only one period, we do not need to consider heterogeneity in households’ discount
factors or in their seasonal preferences as in (1).
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households that the resulting risk premiums more than offset the risk the household faces.
We estimate the welfare cost of aggregate risk separately for each village j in the data,
but to simplify the notation, we suppress the dependence on j in what follows. Our objective
is to estimate the function k(γi) giving welfare costs of aggregate risk as a function of a
household’s risk aversion. To do so, we must estimate village j’s prices p∗s, which appear in
the welfare cost formula (22), and village j’s aggregate shocks ms, which do not appear in the
formula but are required to normalize the prices correctly. Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) proposes
the following procedure, which we follow here.
We have data on a random sample of households in village j for a sequence of dates
τ = 1, . . . , T . Since the model is stationary, we can use the data at different dates to recover
information about the states realized at those dates; averages over many dates will be the
same as averages over the possible states.
The following notation is useful: For any variable ξ, let Eˆτ [ξ] be the sample mean of ξ
across the households in village j at date τ . Also, let θi = 1/γi be household i’s risk tolerance,
and let θ¯ be the mean of θi for all households in village j, including households that are not
in our sample.
First, since our method for estimating preferences identifies households’ preferences
only up to scale, we cannot estimate the mean risk tolerance θ¯. Instead, we assume the mean
risk tolerance is θ¯ = 1, corresponding to logarithmic utility for the average household. When
we describe our results, we discuss how they would change if the mean risk tolerance were
different.
Second, we estimate the aggregate shocks ms as follows. Let ̂lnmτ be the residual from
a time-series regression of the log of the sample average of observed consumption [ln (Eˆτ [ciτ ])]
on an intercept, a time trend, and month dummies. Let mˆτ = exp ( ̂lnmτ ) be the estimated
aggregate shock at date τ ; Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) shows that, in the limit as the numbers
of households and time periods go to infinity, mˆτ is a consistent estimator of the aggregate
shock ms for the state s that was realized at date τ .
Third, we estimate the prices p∗s as follows. Given θ¯, let
̂ln p∗τ (θ¯) be (−1/θ¯) times
the residual from a time-series regression of the sample average of observed log consumption
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[(Eˆτ [ln ciτ ])] on an intercept, time trend, and month dummies.
11 Schulhofer-Wohl (2008)
shows that pˆ∗τ (θ¯) = exp [
̂ln p∗τ (θ¯)] is a consistent estimator of the price p∗s for the state s that
was realized at date τ , in the limit as the numbers of households and time periods go to
infinity. We impose the normalization that
∑
s pisp
∗
sms = 1 by scaling the estimated prices
such that T−1
∑T
τ=1 pˆ
∗
τmˆτ = 1.
Finally, given the estimated prices, we estimate the welfare cost of aggregate risk, as
a function of the household’s risk aversion γi, by replacing averages over states with averages
over dates and replacing actual with estimated prices in (22):
kˆ(γi) = 1−
(
1
T
T∑
τ=1
(pˆ∗τ )
−(1−γi)/γi
)γi/(1−γi)
. (23)
The results in Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) imply that, conditional on the mean risk tolerance
θ¯, kˆ(γi) is a consistent estimator of the welfare cost k(γi) in the limit as the numbers of
households and time periods go to infinity.
It is interesting to consider how the welfare estimates would change if we ignored
heterogeneity. Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) shows that, generically, each household has strictly
lower welfare costs if it lives in a heterogeneous-agent economy than if it is a representative
agent in an economy where all agents have the same preferences. Furthermore, the welfare
cost for a representative agent with risk aversion γi can be estimated by
kˆrep(γi) = 1−
(
1
T
∑
τ
= 1T mˆ1−γiτ
)1/(1−γi)
. (24)
When we turn to the data, we will compare the estimates allowing heterogeneity from (23)
with estimates that incorrectly ignore heterogeneity from (24) and show that allowing hetero-
geneity leads to quantitatively important reductions in the estimated welfare cost of aggregate
risk.
Although kˆ is a consistent estimator of the true welfare cost, kˆ is biased away from zero.
11The regression here is the same as that used to estimate aggregate shocks, except that for aggregate
shocks, the dependent variable was the log of mean consumption, while for prices, the dependent variable is
the mean of log consumption.
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The reason is that the estimated aggregate shocks and prices vary over time both because
actual shocks hit the economy and because, in a finite sample, measurement error causes the
average of households’ observed consumption to fluctuate more than the average of their true
consumption. In consequence, the data make the economy appear riskier than it really is.
Following Schulhofer-Wohl (2008), we solve this problem with a bootstrap bias correction. Let
kˆ be the estimated willingness to pay in the original sample, and let k1, . . . , kQ be estimates
calculated using Q different samples of the same size as the original sample, drawn from the
original data with replacement. A bias-corrected estimate of k is 2kˆ∗ −∑Qq=1 kq/Q.12
3. Data
We apply the estimation methods described in the previous section to the households
in the Townsend Thai Monthly Survey. The survey has relatively high frequency over many
years, providing us with a relatively long time series on consumption fluctuations. This
section presents a brief background on the survey and descriptive statistics of the variables we
analyze. Detailed description of the survey, construction of financial variables, and additional
descriptive statistics can be found in Samphantharak and Townsend (2010, 2011).
A. The Townsend Thai Monthly Survey and Sample Selection
The Townsend Thai Monthly Survey is an ongoing intensive monthly survey initiated
in 1998 in four provinces of Thailand. Chachoengsao and Lopburi are semi-urban provinces
in a more developed central region near the capital city, Bangkok. Buriram and Sisaket
provinces, on the other hand, are rural and located in a less developed northeastern region
by the border of Cambodia. In each of the four provinces, the survey is conducted in four
villages. This monthly survey began with an initial village-wide census. Every structure and
every household was enumerated, and the defined “household” units were created based on
12Our bootstrap procedure must deal with two sources of sampling variation: We have data on only some
households in the village and on only some time periods from the entire history of the world. To address
these two sources of variation, we resample both households and time periods in our bootstrap procedure.
Specifically, we first draw households from the original data with replacement, generating a list of households
to include in the bootstrap sample. Next, we resample with replacement 12-month blocks of time (to account
for serial correlation in shocks) and generate a list of months to include in the bootstrap sample. The
bootstrap sample then consists of data points corresponding to each household on the list of households, for
each month on the list of months.
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sleeping and eating patterns. Further, all individuals, households, and residential structures
in each of the 16 villages can be identified in subsequent, monthly responses. From the
village-wide census, approximately 45 households in each village were randomly sampled to
become survey respondents. The survey itself began in August 1998 with a baseline interview
on initial conditions of sampled households. The monthly updates started in September 1998
and track inputs, outputs, and changing conditions of the same households over time.
Sample selection for households included in this paper deserves special attention. First,
the data used in this paper are based on the 84 months starting from month 5, from January
1999 through December 2005. These months are the entire sample available at the time of
the initial writing of this draft and reflect the fact that data for analysis are received from
the field survey unit with a considerable lag. Second, we include only the households that
were present in the survey throughout the 84 months, dropping households that moved out
of the village before month 88 as well as households that were later added to the survey
to replace the drop-out households. This criterion also ensures that consumption for each
household is strictly positive in every month, allowing us to have a balanced panel of the
monthly change in consumption. Third, we drop households whose income data are missing
in any month. Overall, our restrictions eliminate 29 percent of the households in the initial
survey, leaving a final sample of 505 households: 141 from Chachoengsao, 102 from Buriram,
122 from Lopburi, and 140 from Sisaket. (Of the households dropped from the data, about
half are dropped because their consumption data are missing in some months, and about half
for other reasons.)
B. Construction of Consumption Variable
Our consumption variable includes both monthly consumption of food and monthly
expenditure on nonfood items and utilities. Food consumption includes the consumption of
outputs such as crops produced by the household, the consumption of food from invento-
ries, and expenditures on food provided by nonhousehold members. Unlike other modules of
the Townsend Thai Monthly Survey, several consumption items are collected weekly during
months 1–25 and biweekly afterward, in order to minimize recall errors. We convert consump-
tion to per capita units by dividing by the number of household members present during the
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month to which the consumption refers.
We put consumption in real terms by deflating the data with the monthly Consumer
Price Index (CPI) at the regional level from the Thailand Ministry of Commerce. Although
we realize that inflation in each village could differ from regional inflation, we must rely on
the regional statistics because we do not have a reliable village-level price index at the time
of writing this paper.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for household consumption. Mean per capita
real consumption is 1607.2 Thai baht per month (in 2007 baht). According to the Penn
World Table (Heston et al., 2011), purchasing power parity in 2007 was 15.39 baht per U.S.
dollar, so on average, households in the sample live on the equivalent of about U.S. $3.43 per
person, per day.
C. Construction of Income Variable
The income data come from the underlying survey instruments, which distinguish
several potential income sources: crops, livestock, fish and shrimp, and wage earning. For
each source, both revenues and expenses are measured to calculate a net profit. Further,
income and all other variables are cross-checked with each other via the creation of standard
financial accounts, treating the households as if they were firms; see Samphantharak and
Townsend (2010). These accounts include a statement of income, a statement of cash flow,
and a balance sheet. In our analysis, we use the accrual notion of income, in which expenses
are booked at the time of sale of product, rather than the cash-flow notion in which expenses
are booked when paid. (We have conducted robustness checks to ensure that our results do
not depend on using the accrual notion of income.)
4. Results
This section presents the results from applying our methods for testing efficiency,
estimating preferences, and estimating the welfare costs of aggregate risk to the Thai data.
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A. Test of Efficient Risk Sharing
Table 2 presents the tests of efficient risk sharing based on (17).13 The coefficient
on income is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in only one of the 16 villages.
When we estimate a common coefficient on income across all villages, we gain statistical
power but nonetheless only barely reject the null of full insurance. We note that the evidence
against full insurance is weak even though we have not allowed for nonseparability between
consumption and leisure, which would lead our test to over-reject full insurance.14 In results
not reported here, we failed to reject full insurance when we ignored preference heterogeneity
and estimated (15). In addition, in table 3 we show tests of the hypothesis that there is
efficient risk sharing both within and across the four study villages in each province and fail
to reject full risk sharing in any of the four provinces.15 We think, therefore, that there is
little evidence against full insurance in the villages we study, and that it is reasonable to
proceed to estimate risk preferences under the maintained hypothesis of full insurance.
B. Estimation of Risk Preferences
Figure 2 shows the distribution of estimated risk tolerance. Because our method
identifies risk preferences only up to an unknown village-specific scale, we normalize the
estimates so that the mean risk tolerance is 1 in each village. (We normalize the mean
risk tolerance rather than the mean risk aversion because risk tolerance is aggregable in the
sense of Wilson, 1968, whereas risk aversion is not aggregable.) It is important to remember
that the estimated risk tolerances whose distribution appears in the figure consist of each
household’s true risk tolerance plus some estimation error. Some of the dispersion in the
distribution is thus due to estimation error rather than true heterogeneity in risk preferences.
Despite the presence of estimation error,16 it is comforting to see that households never have
13For these tests only, but not for the rest of the paper, we use total consumption and income rather than
per capita variables because converting to per capita units would produce a mechanical correlation between
measured per capita income and measured per capita consumption if there is any measurement error in
household size.
14Classical measurement error in income would lead our test to under-reject full insurance. However,
unless the signal-to-noise ratio is small — which we think is unlikely given the detailed nature of the survey
questionnaire — this bias is small.
15For these tests, we re-estimate households’ preferences under the maintained hypothesis of full risk sharing
among the four study villages in each province.
16We do not attempt to deconvolve the distribution of true risk tolerance and the distribution of the
estimation error because the number of households in each village is small and deconvolution estimators have
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risk tolerance wildly higher than the village mean, and only a small fraction of households
have a negative estimate for risk tolerance. Table 4 summarizes the distribution of estimated
risk tolerance by village. The standard deviation of the estimates varies substantially across
villages, but the standard deviation is nearly uncorrelated with the number of households in
the village, suggesting that this variation is not driven by estimation error; rather, it seems
likely that some villages have more heterogeneity than others in true risk preferences.
Table 5 presents the tests of the null hypothesis of identical risk preferences, based
on the GMM overidentification statistic for moment conditions (8). We reject the null of
identical preferences at the 5 percent level in four of the 16 villages and at the 10 percent
level in eight of the 16. When we pool the data from all villages, we gain statistical power
and strongly reject the null that preferences are identical within each village. (Our pooled
test makes no assumptions about whether there is heterogeneity across villages.)
Table 6 examines the relationship of risk tolerance to observed demographic character-
istics of the household in the initial round of the survey. We find little evidence that estimated
risk preferences are related to demographics. There is a positive, statistically significant rela-
tionship between risk tolerance and the head’s age. Education, net wealth, and the numbers
of men, women, and children in the household are not associated with risk tolerance. These
patterns persist whether or not we include village fixed effects in the regressions. In addition,
observed demographics explain only a few percent of the variation in estimated risk tolerance.
Theory provides little guidance as to whether we should expect observable variables to be
related to preferences. For example, net wealth may depend in large part on a household’s
initial endowment when the economy began, but theory has little to say about whether the
initial endowment, and thus wealth, will be related to preferences. Recall also that, under
complete markets, wealth per se has nothing to do with risk aversion: Complete markets lead
to a complete separation between consumption and production, so there is no reason why
risk preferences in themselves should affect how much wealth a household accumulates.17
very slow convergence rates (Horowitz, 1998, chap. 4). (The deconvolution would have to proceed village
by village because the distribution of estimation error — which could be estimated from our GMM moment
conditions — varies across villages due to differences in sample size.)
17Note, however, that households with a higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution will accumulate
more wealth if the economy is growing over time (Dumas, 1989; Wang, 1996). With time-separable expected
utility, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
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C. Welfare Costs of Aggregate Risk
In table 7 and figure 3, we turn to estimating the welfare costs of aggregate risk.
Table 7 shows the willingness to pay to eliminate aggregate risk for a household with the
mean risk tolerance, under our benchmark assumption that the mean risk tolerance is 1.
Welfare losses for households with the mean risk tolerance are on the order of 1 percent
of mean consumption, or about 10 times what has been estimated for the United States
(Lucas, 1987; Schulhofer-Wohl, 2008). However, owing to the small sample size for each
village, our estimates are imprecise and the 95 percent confidence intervals for the mean
household’s welfare loss include zero in all but two villages. The estimates also show that
allowing heterogeneity matters dramatically for the results: The welfare costs are typically
two to three times as large if we assume all households have identical risk preferences.
Figure 3 shows the importance of heterogeneity for understanding the welfare cost of
risk. The figure contains a separate graph for each village. The graph shows the welfare cost
of aggregate risk, on the vertical axis, as a function of a household’s risk tolerance, on the
horizontal axis. In each village, the more risk tolerant a household is, the smaller its welfare
cost, as evidenced by the downward slope of the welfare cost function as we move to the right
on the graphs. Furthermore, households that are sufficiently close to risk neutral have welfare
gains from aggregate risk: The welfare cost is less than zero. For example, in village 9 in
Sisaket, some very risk-averse households — those with risk tolerance close to zero — have
welfare losses from aggregate risk equivalent to about 3 percent of consumption; however,
households with risk tolerance of 5, equivalent to a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 0.2,
have welfare gains of about 4 percent of consumption.
5. Conclusion
This paper uses the benchmark of full risk sharing, but incorporates heterogeneity in
risk preferences, and presents a novel way to test the null hypotheses of full insurance and of
homogeneous risk preferences. The first hypothesis, perfect risk sharing, cannot be rejected
even in pooled data with some power, whereas the second hypothesis, homogeneity, is soundly
Thus, there is some reason, in a time-separable expected utility model, to expect a relationship between
wealth and risk aversion. A model with, for example, recursive utility could break this link.
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rejected (even though common unobserved measurement error would bias this test toward
failing to reject the null). Our method uses an unusually long panel data set on households
in each of four diverse regions of an emerging market country, Thailand, treating villages and
then counties as the risk-sharing unit. We also use the data to quantify the welfare impact of
(counterfactual) insurance against village-level aggregate shocks. Overall, the welfare costs of
aggregate risk, and the gains from insurance, are less than they would be under homogeneous
preferences. Further, relatively risk-tolerant households would actually lose under policy
interventions that remove risk, because when risk is present these households benefit from
providing de facto insurance to their more risk-averse neighbors.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Variable mean std. dev.
real total consumption per capita 1607.2 2928.7
ln(real total consumption per capita) 7.07 0.68
real net income 12,351.2 45,157.4
ln(real net income) 6.94 3.50
adult men 1.43 0.83
adult women 1.61 0.80
children 1.47 1.23
head’s age 52.1 13.6
highest education (years) 8.3 3.7
net wealth (millions of baht) 2.26 12.4
households 505
monthly observations 42,420
The table reports descriptive statistics for household con-
sumption and demographics. The unit of analysis is the
household-month. Consumption (in Thai baht) is monthly
household food consumption and monthly household expen-
diture on nonfood consumption items. Consumption is ad-
justed to real per capita units using monthly household size
data and regional Consumer Price Index (base year 2007).
Demographics and net wealth are measured in the initial sur-
vey.
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Table 2: Tests of efficient risk sharing at the village level.
village coeff. std. err. p-value obs. HH R2
Chachoengsao
2 -0.0313 0.0490 0.527 3444 41 0.039
4 -0.0949 0.8099 0.907 3192 38 0.020
7 0.1197 0.4118 0.773 2520 30 0.038
8 0.0976 0.1115 0.388 2688 32 0.057
Buriram
2 0.2156 0.2992 0.476 3024 36 0.029
10 0.0170 0.0882 0.851 1092 13 0.092
13 0.0703 0.0492 0.166 2184 26 0.128
14 0.1845 0.1105 0.107 2268 27 0.122
Lopburi
1 -0.1059 0.1984 0.597 2688 32 0.038
3 1.6043 1.2067 0.199 1764 21 0.074
4 0.2643 0.3172 0.410 3192 38 0.031
6 0.7524 0.5867 0.209 2604 31 0.025
Sisaket
1 0.1297∗ 0.0529 0.019 3276 39 0.085
6 -0.0462 0.0874 0.600 3612 43 0.031
9 0.0493 0.0406 0.232 3108 37 0.088
10 0.2012 0.1563 0.213 1764 21 0.063
pooled
- 0.1662∗ 0.0828 0.045 42420 505 0.025
The table reports the effect of idiosyncratic income shocks
on the product of log consumption and estimated risk aver-
sion. Unit of observation is household-month. Consumption
is monthly household food consumption and monthly house-
hold expenditure on nonfood consumption items. Income
is monthly accrued income. Consumption and income are
adjusted for inflation using regional Consumer Price Index.
Each row reports a separate regression using data from one
village. Column labeled “coeff.” reports the coefficient on log
income in an OLS regression of the product of estimated risk
aversion and log consumption on household fixed effects, time
fixed effects, and log income (17); “std. err.” is the standard
error, clustered by household; p-value is for a test of the null
hypothesis that the coefficient on log income is zero; “obs.”
is the number of household-month observations; and “HH” is
the number of households. Pooled regression uses data from
all villages and interacts time effects with village effects to
allow different aggregate shocks by village. ∗ indicates co-
efficient is statistically significantly different from zero at 5
percent level. 28
Table 3: Tests of efficient risk sharing at the province level.
province coeff. std. err. p-value obs. HH R2
Chachoengsao 0.3398 0.2424 0.163 11,844 141 0.007
Buriram 0.1127 0.0626 0.075 8,568 102 0.009
Lopburi -0.3633 0.1950 0.065 10,248 122 0.008
Sisaket 0.1354 0.0821 0.101 11,760 140 0.010
pooled 0.0604 0.0833 0.469 42,420 505 0.007
The table reports the effect of idiosyncratic income shocks on the
product of log consumption and estimated risk aversion. Unit of ob-
servation is household-month. Consumption is monthly household
food consumption and monthly household expenditure on nonfood
consumption items. Income is monthly accrued income. Consump-
tion and income are adjusted for inflation using regional Consumer
Price Index. Each row reports a separate regression using data from
one province. Column labeled “coeff.” reports the coefficient on log
income in an OLS regression of the product of estimated risk aversion
and log consumption on household fixed effects, time fixed effects, and
log income (17); “std. err.” is the standard error, clustered by house-
hold; p-value is for a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient
on log income is zero; “obs.” is the number of household-month ob-
servations; and “HH” is the number of households. Pooled regression
uses data from all provinces and interacts time effects with province
effects to allow different aggregate shocks by province.
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Table 4: Distribution of estimated risk tolerance.
percentiles
village min 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th max std. dev. γˆi < 0 HH
Chachoengsao
1 -2.54 -0.60 0.17 1.31 1.86 2.37 3.67 1.41 0.20 41
2 -2.98 -0.13 0.14 0.79 2.17 2.53 3.35 1.28 0.13 38
3 -0.50 -0.10 0.20 0.92 1.57 2.55 3.11 0.98 0.20 30
4 -0.90 0.23 0.52 0.84 1.50 1.86 3.12 0.79 0.03 32
Buriram
5 -0.97 -0.01 0.63 1.06 1.42 1.76 2.93 0.73 0.11 36
6 -0.70 -0.33 0.85 1.22 1.41 2.01 2.25 0.83 0.15 13
7 -0.22 0.35 0.65 0.97 1.37 1.57 2.05 0.50 0.04 26
8 0.12 0.33 0.54 1.02 1.31 1.85 2.17 0.52 0.00 27
Lopburi
9 -1.73 -0.40 0.31 1.04 1.75 2.08 3.40 1.12 0.19 32
10 -0.96 -0.05 0.56 1.11 1.65 2.02 2.72 0.88 0.14 21
11 -1.31 0.15 0.35 0.92 1.32 2.77 3.52 0.96 0.08 38
12 -0.72 0.05 0.29 0.78 1.42 1.88 3.85 1.12 0.10 31
Sisaket
13 -0.38 0.34 0.72 1.07 1.38 1.57 1.81 0.48 0.03 39
14 -0.49 0.36 0.64 1.05 1.36 1.69 2.00 0.52 0.02 43
15 0.12 0.36 0.76 0.99 1.23 1.59 1.78 0.41 0.00 37
16 0.09 0.56 0.70 0.82 1.18 1.73 2.37 0.53 0.00 21
pooled
- -2.98 0.07 0.52 0.98 1.45 2.00 3.85 0.87 505 0.09
The table reports summary statistics from the distribution of estimates of households’ risk
tolerances θi = 1/γi in each village, after normalizing risk tolerance to have mean 1 in each
village. The risk tolerance estimates are obtained by estimating moment condition (8) by
two-step efficient GMM. Unit of observation in the table is household. Unit of observation
for estimating (8) is household-month. Consumption is monthly household food consump-
tion and monthly household expenditure on nonfood consumption items. Consumption is
adjusted to real per capita units using monthly household size data and regional Consumer
Price Index.
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Table 5: Tests for heterogeneity in risk
preferences.
village χ2 d.f. p-value
Chachoengsao
2 50.68 40 0.120
4 51.91 37 0.053
7 54.93 29 0.003
8 53.19 31 0.008
Buriram
2 48.03 35 0.070
10 8.72 12 0.726
13 34.19 25 0.104
14 44.15 26 0.015
Lopburi
1 42.23 31 0.086
3 29.32 20 0.082
4 46.76 37 0.130
6 47.98 30 0.020
Sisaket
1 48.57 38 0.117
6 46.3 42 0.299
9 37.81 36 0.387
10 23.09 20 0.284
pooled
- 667.86 489 1.22×10−7
The table reports tests of the null hypothesis that all households in a given village have
the same coefficient of relative risk tolerance. χ2 is the overidentification test statistic for
the null hypothesis that all households in the village have the same risk tolerance, ob-
tained by estimating moment condition (8) by two-step efficient GMM under the restriction
γ1 = γ2 = · · · = γNj ; “d.f.” is the degrees of freedom of the χ2 statistic, equal to the number
of households in the village minus one. Pooled test is for the hypothesis that risk tolerance is
constant within each village, without assuming anything about heterogeneity across villages.
Unit of observation is household-month. Consumption is monthly household food consump-
tion and monthly household expenditure on nonfood consumption items. Consumption is
adjusted to real per capita units using monthly household size data and regional Consumer
Price Index.
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Table 6: Association between household demographics and estimated risk tolerance.
estimated risk tolerance
A. Without village fixed effects
adult men 0.010 0.008
(0.007) (0.007)
adult women 0.006 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
children 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
head’s age 0.001∗ 0.001∗
(0.000) (0.000)
highest education -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
net wealth (millions of baht) -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
joint signif. p-value 0.0618
R-squared 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.027
B. With village fixed effects
adult men 0.009 0.007
(0.005) (0.007)
adult women 0.006 0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
children -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
head’s age 0.001∗ 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
highest education 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
net wealth (millions of baht) -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
joint signif. p-value 0.0315
R-squared 0.134 0.130 0.129 0.139 0.128 0.128 0.144
Observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 505
The table reports the association between demographic variables and households’ estimated pref-
erences. The unit of observation is the household. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
clustered by village in parentheses. Demographics are measured in the initial survey. Net wealth
is in millions of baht. “Joint signif. p-value” is the p-value for the null hypothesis that the coef-
ficients on all of the demographic variables are zero in a regression including all the variables at
once. ∗ indicates coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
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Table 7: Estimated welfare cost of aggregate risk for a household with the mean
risk tolerance, by village.
willingness to pay to eliminate aggregate risk
allowing heterogeneous preferences assuming identical preferences
village estimate 95% c.i. estimate 95% c.i.
Chachoengsao
2 0.8% (-0.3%,1.7%) 1.7% (-0.2%,3.0%)
4 0.9% (-0.8%,2.3%) 2.3% (-1.7%,4.4%)
7 0.5% (-1.1%,2.6%) 2.6% (-1.0%,4.7%)
8 1.4% (0.1%,2.1%) 2.1% (0.0%,3.5%)
Buriram
2 1.5% (-1.0%,3.3%) 3.3% (-1.0%,6.2%)
10 2.4% (-3.4%,8.0%) 8.0% (-0.3%,14.1%)
13 1.5% (-0.4%,2.5%) 2.5% (-0.2%,4.4%)
14 2.3% (-0.1%,4.2%) 4.2% (0.3%,7.1%)
Lopburi
1 0.4% (-0.8%,1.4%) 1.4% (-1.1%,2.7%)
3 1.1% (-1.8%,2.8%) 2.8% (-2.0%,5.3%)
4 0.4% (-0.5%,0.8%) 0.8% (-0.7%,1.9%)
6 0.4% (-0.6%,1.2%) 1.2% (-0.5%,2.5%)
Sisaket
1 0.3% (-0.9%,1.8%) 1.8% (-1.1%,3.3%)
6 1.5% (-0.5%,3.4%) 3.4% (-0.4%,5.8%)
9 1.6% (0.1%,2.5%) 2.5% (0.4%,4.2%)
10 2.4% (-1.8%,6.6%) 6.6% (0.7%,10.9%)
The table reports the estimated willingness to pay to eliminate aggregate risk
in each village for a household with the mean risk tolerance, assuming the
mean risk tolerance is 1. Willingness to pay is reported as a percentage of
mean consumption. Results under “allowing heterogeneous preferences” show
the estimates from our heterogeneous-preferences formula (23); results under
“assuming identical preferences” show the estimates from the formula (24) that
assumes all households have the mean risk tolerance. “Estimate” is the boot-
strap bias-corrected point estimate of willingness to pay, and “95% c.i.” is
the 95 percent equal-tailed percentile confidence interval, calculated from 1,000
bootstrap samples drawn from the original sample with replacement. To con-
struct each bootstrap sample, we first draw households from the original data
with replacement, generating a list of households to include in the bootstrap
sample; next, we resample with replacement 12-month blocks of time (to ac-
count for serial correlation in shocks) and generate a list of months to include
in the bootstrap sample; finally, the bootstrap sample consists of data points
corresponding to each household on the list of households, for each month on
the list of months.
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